# PUTTING GROUPS BACK INTO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE*

**James L. Gibson**
*Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government*
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1063
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
jgibson@wustl.edu

Fellow, Centre for Comparative and International Politics
*Professor Extraordinary in Political Science*
Stellenbosch University (South Africa)

**Christopher Claassen**
*Lecturer in Politics*
School of Social and Political Sciences
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, G12 8QQ
United Kingdom
christopher.claassen@glasgow.ac.uk

**Joan Barceló**
*Graduate Student*
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1063
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
joanbarcelosoler@wustl.edu

Version 37, June 14, 2017

*The Freedom and Tolerance Surveys upon which this paper relies were funded by the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University in St. Louis. We greatly appreciate the support provided for this research by Steven S. Smith, Director of the Center. We appreciate the comments of Antonia Drummond, Ewa A. Golebiowska, Erin Halperin, George Marcus, Mark Peffley, Michael B. Petersen, Monica Schneider, Rune Slothuus, Rune Stubager, Paul Sniderman, and Daniel Stevens on an earlier version of this chapter.

The modern, empirical study of political intolerance can easily be divided into two dominant eras: the Stouffer era and the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus era. These periods are largely defined by the method of measuring political intolerance. During the Stouffer era, researchers identified the groups potentially subject to mass intolerance and asked respondents whether they would tolerate political activity by those groups. The Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus era ushered in the "least-liked" method of assessing intolerance, an approach that allows the respondents themselves to specify the targets of their intolerance.

The basic, underlying insight of the least-liked approach is that one cannot tolerate a group or an idea of which one approves. Tolerance is not being measured when we ask atheists whether they would be willing to tolerate political activities by atheists.[1] In one sense, the least-liked approach to measuring intolerance takes individual groups and ideas out of the equation. Asking about groups in the least-liked approach is merely a means of getting equivalent targets about which tolerance questions can be asked. All groups are in effect the same ("content controlled"), because they all qualify as the respondents' least-liked groups. The groups themselves are then, in essence, discarded.

There can be no doubt that the least-liked measurement approach has been an invaluable contribution to the tolerance literature. However, the basic assumption of the approach – that once the group is qualified as being a least-liked group, the group's identity is of little significance – has not been subjected to much rigorous empirical analysis. Does it matter that

[1] The Stouffer approach is most useful when there is consensus in society as to where the threats lie, as in the United States in the 1950s and contemporary Israel today. If consensus exists, the least-liked approach will tend to generate the same targets of intolerance as the fixed-group approach. If threat is pluralistic, then the two approaches can diverge quite a bit.

Jane selects radical Muslims as her most disliked group, whereas Dick selects gay rights activists? Is being "least-liked" the only relevant attribute of groups that must be controlled?

Our purpose in this chapter is to determine whether it is worthwhile to "bring groups back into" the study of political intolerance. We consider our approach not as an attack on the utility of the least-liked technology, but instead as an extension to the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus approach, one that incorporates in the analysis more information about the groups selected as least-liked.

We pursue several specific empirical questions relating to the effects groups have on tolerance judgments. First, we test whether average levels of tolerance, as measured using the least-liked technique, vary by group. We might expect that they do not, because respondents are asked about their tolerance toward groups they rate as among their most disliked. We find however that average levels of political tolerance vary quite substantially across disliked groups.

We then turn to a second question: whether the inter-group variance in tolerance remains once group threat is accounted for. While nominal groups are constants, via all being least-liked, they are also variables, via the measures of threat perceptions. Indeed, threat perceptions are typically found to be among the best predictors of intolerance. We find, however, that groups continue to account for significant additional variance in tolerance beyond that explained by threat, and, indeed, even beyond that explained by a fully-specified model of tolerance including demographics, socio-political values, evaluations of group attributes, and emotional reactions to the groups. The large unexplained variance of group differences in intolerance that remains in the model including respondents' characteristics and group perceptions suggests that differences

in political tolerance across groups may not be associated with differences across individuals who select one group over another, but with attributes located at the level of the group.

In an effort to understand this stubborn inter-group variance in tolerance, we apply fixed effects and multilevel modeling techniques to this fully-specified model. Fixed-effects models allow us to focus on intra-group variance by partialling out the inter-group variance in the dependent variable. We find that the conventional wisdom of tolerance being a function of threat, dogmatism, and democratic values remains largely unperturbed, but evaluations of group attributes, including threat and whether groups are perceived as democratic, become a little weaker when we restrict our focus to their effects on intra-group variance in tolerance.

The final question to which we turn is whether group-level attributes help explain some of the puzzling inter-group variation in tolerance. We obtain these group-level measures for each of five variables by using Heckman selection models to adjust the group averages for selection bias: sociotriopic and egocentric threat, group power, the extent to which groups are perceived to be undemocratic, and the extent to which they have a reputation for being violent. We include these measures in multilevel models so as to investigate whether reputations earned by groups, whether fairly or not, for being democratic, violent, or threatening, help explain the group-specific differences in tolerance. We find that groups that are perceived to be undemocratic and, surprisingly, *not* very powerful, face elevated risks of being the focus of mass intolerance. At the same time, we do not any find a significant effect for group reputations for being threatening and/or violent. Thus, our analyses lead us to conclude that there is indeed utility to bringing groups back into the study of political intolerance, although many questions remain unanswered.

**The Conventional Least-Liked Technology**

Stouffer's (1955) fixed-group measurement methodology dominated early research on political intolerance. In this approach, researchers pre-select a set of relatively unpopular political groups and all respondents are asked to state whether they would tolerate activities by these groups. While Stouffer's approach has historically been quite popular and is still widely used today (e.g., the General Social Survey), it has also been subject to several criticisms (Sullivan et al. 1981; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979, 1982; Gibson 1992).

Conceptually, to tolerate is generally defined as "to put up with that with which one disagrees" (Gibson 2006: 22). Thus, measuring tolerance requires an *objection precondition* in its operationalization since one can only tolerate extending political rights to groups with interests and ideas that one *opposes*. To the extent that Stouffer's question format includes people who do not oppose the interests and ideas of the pre-selected groups, responses to the tolerance items do not capture the concept of tolerance.

In view of such empirical and conceptual difficulties, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979, 1982) and Sullivan et al. (1981) proposed in their path-breaking work an alternative approach: the least-liked measurement technology, a "content-controlled" measure of an individual's tolerance. This approach works in two steps. In the first step, researchers provide respondents with a list of relatively unpopular groups from varying ideological stances. Then, respondents are asked to identify a group they like the least.[2] In the second step, respondents are

[2] The respondents are allowed to supplement the list of groups with any group that they dislike a great deal.

asked to state whether they would tolerate political activities by this group.

The least-liked measurement technology overcomes many of the empirical difficulties of Stouffer's approach. Most importantly, the "content-controlled" nature of the measurement means that all respondents react to the same group stimulus by effectively holding constant a respondent's affect toward the group in question. Responses are, thus, conceptually equivalent: all respondents are being asked whether they would tolerate activities by their least-liked group. Therefore, this approach satisfies the objection precondition requirement, as well as offering a time-unbounded measure because it is unaffected by temporal changes in the salience of groups.

Notwithstanding these assets, measurement validity depends on the assumption that the groups are functionally equivalent. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus argued that the groups selected should be viewed "as having an equivalent meaning for all of [the respondents], even though they may select different groups" (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982: 63). Thus, one respondent's most disliked group is expected to be functionally equivalent to that of another, i.e., groups should not matter. Although this measurement technology is now widely used in research on tolerance, this assumption tends not to be explicitly invoked and has not been subject to empirical scrutiny. In this chapter, we will explore this assumption by investigating the role the groups selected as least-liked play in structuring political intolerance.

**Adding Groups to the Model**

In a recent article, Petersen et al. (2011) also argue strongly that the identity of the groups used in measures of political tolerance must be taken into account. Not all groups are created equal. In

particular, they argue that groups that have a reputation for being undemocratic and/or violent are less likely to be tolerated. They conclude from their empirical analysis that: "In general, our findings suggest that scholars should increasingly focus on how tolerance judgments vary across distinct groups and theorize about how the specific characteristics of a group influence the way tolerance is expressed" (2011, 595). Their findings indicate that the Danish respondents do indeed tend to treat groups they perceive to be anti-democratic and violent differently from democratic and non-violent groups.

We continue Petersen et al.'s line of investigation. Our strategy is as follows. First, we examine whether the average level of tolerance that is expressed by the respondents varies as a function of the group they select as disliked. Since the least-liked technique is designed to control for content, any significant variance in tolerance by group would indicate that there is unexamined inter-group variance in tolerance. Scholars have conventionally taken account of group characteristics in micro-level models of tolerance by including threat perceptions (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), and more recently, by including emotional reactions (e.g., Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009; Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse 1998; Marcus et al. 2005). Our next step is therefore to examine whether tolerance varies by group once we have controlled for variables, such as threat and socio-political values, which are included in the standard micro-level model. We then add additional perceptions of group attributes to the micro-level model. Finally, because OLS regression models of tolerance do not distinguish between intra- and intergroup variance in tolerance, we move to a multilevel linear modeling framework, which allows separate models for these two sources of variance.

**Data and Measures**

The data we analyze are known as the Freedom and Tolerance Surveys (FATS). These surveys, conducted from 2007 through 2011, use a generally constant methodology, the same survey firm, and a largely invariant survey instrument, and the interviews were conducted on the telephone (with cell-phone sub-samples added in the 2010 and 2011 surveys). The samples were randomly selected from the population of phone-owners 18 years old and older (for further details see Appendix A).[3] Because earlier analyses have shown little change within the time-period of the surveys (Gibson 2013), we collapse them into a single database of approximately 4,000 respondents.

*Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance*

As we have noted, the least-liked approach begins by querying the respondents about their feelings toward a variety of groups selected by the researcher, but supplemented by nominations from the respondents themselves.[4] Table 1 reports the descriptive results from the FATS data.

[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

According to these data, the Ku Klux Klan is the most disliked among these groups, with more than two-thirds of the respondents naming members of the Klan as most or third-most disliked (see below). Still, other groups are highly disliked: a majority of Americans feel very

[3]The AAPOR Response Rates #3 are 29.5, 30.5, 30.5, 30.9, and 29.6 percent, for the 2007 through 2011 surveys, respectively.

[4] We are aware of no research about how the initial list of groups given to the respondents might frame the selection of groups for the tolerance questions. Our objective in constructing the list was merely to provide people of vastly different ideological stripes an opportunity to identify a greatly disliked group.

cold toward militarists, atheists, radical Muslims, and U.S. Communists. Only a single group – conservatives – attract a mean feeling thermometer score warmer than the mid-point on the one hundred and one-point scale.

Originally, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus focused primarily on asking tolerance questions about the most disliked group. Others, however, have expanded the questioning by asking about other highly disliked groups (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003). In the case of the FATS surveys, the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked the tolerance questions about their most disliked group or their third most disliked group. The logic of this approach is that greater variability is introduced by asking about less extreme but still highly disliked groups, even if this requires that the status of the group be controlled in subsequent analyses.

In the FATS, the respondents were then asked about whether these groups ought to be allowed to give speeches, run candidates for public office, and hold public demonstrations. Speaking, seeking public office, and demonstrating are all rights that democracies must allow for all political points-of-view (e.g., Dahl 1971), so these are valid measures of political tolerance.[5] Table 2 reports the replies of these respondents.

[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The American people are roughly evenly divided on whether these groups ought to be allowed their civil liberties. The division is closest for the most disliked group – for instance,

[5] Just as we argue that groups ought to be brought back into the study of political tolerance, Gibson and Bingham (1982) argued that attitudes toward activities ought to be given more attention as well. Pursuing their argument is beyond the scope of this chapter, although we measure political tolerance using items about actions involved in contesting for political power, eschewing, for example, conventional measures about teaching in schools (and, following Gibson 2006, rejecting altogether measures of social tolerance).

49.4 % would allow a speech by the group, while 43.1 % would not. For the other highly disliked group, tolerance is more common than intolerance, although about one-third of the respondents would not tolerate any of the activities by this group. Limited variability in tolerance exists across the three activities.

We created a combined index of intolerance from these three indicators. The item-set has strong psychometric properties, with relatively high reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .75), fairly strong unidimensionality (the eigenvalue of the second factor extracted in a Common Factor Analysis is .64), and roughly equal validity of the indicators (as shown by approximately equivalent factor loadings of the items on the first unrotated factor). We computed a simple summated index to serve as the dependent variable for our analysis. We scored the index (and all other variables in this analysis) to range from 0 to 1.

*Independent Variables*

Following convention (e.g., Gibson 2006) and earlier analyses of these data (Gibson 2013), we have created indices of three sub-dimensions of threat perceptions: sociotropic threat, egocentric threat, and perceptions of group power. Sociotropic threat was measured by two items, one asking whether the group is "not dangerous to society" versus "dangerous to society," and the other asking to rate the group as "not dangerous to the normal lives of people" versus "dangerous to the normal lives of people." Egocentric threat perceptions were also measured by two items: whether the group would or would not "reduce your personal political freedom," and whether the group would or would not "if they gained power, affect your personal security." Finally, group

power was measured with three questions: Whether the group is "likely to gain a lot of power in the United States" versus unlikely; whether the group is "unlikely to affect how well my family and I live" versus "likely to affect how well my family and I live"; and whether the group is "powerful" or not. The measures are positively intercorrelated (if one type of threat is perceived, the other types are also likely to be perceived), but not strongly so (with the bivariate correlations ranging from .25 to .32). Across all groups, political tolerance is correlated with sociotropic threat at −.26, egocentric threat at −.16, and perceived group power at −.03.

Gibson's analysis (2013) provides a basic model of the predictors of tolerance that we find useful. However, we add to that analysis a few additional variables to more fully incorporate group attributes into the analysis.

*Other Perceived Attributes of the Group*. Our respondents were asked about the degree to which their disliked group were "not willing to follow the rules of democracy." The groups vary significantly ($p < .001$; $eta^2 = .05$) in their perceived commitment to democracy, with members of the Ku Klux Klan judged to be the least democratic. Perhaps a little surprisingly, 7 of the 11 groups have mean scores near the mid-point of the 0 through 1 scale (.45 through .55). Most respondents are willing to tar their disliked group with the brush of anti-democraticness.[6]

*Emotional Engagement with the Group*: Social scientists have long considered the role of emotion in inducing political intolerance (e.g., Kuklinski, et al. 1991; Marcus, et al. 1995; Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse 1998), often within a simple model positing that intolerance flows from emotional engagement with a threatening group, whereas tolerance is a position

[6] We are entirely agnostic as to whether these groups are in fact anti-democratic and/or violent. The variable we employ in our analysis is simply perceptions of this attribute.

requiring cognition and relatively sophisticated thinking. Indeed, the "sober second thought" model (e.g., Gibson 1998) understands intolerance as an immediate, emotional reaction to a threatening group (especially to threatening symbols, such as the Nazi swastika), while tolerance results from considered thought in which competing objectives are weighed and balanced.

We asked the respondents to rate their most disliked group or their third most disliked group in terms of three emotional terms: anger, hatred, and fear. Although the responses to these three items were moderately intercorrelated (mean correlation = .41; Cronbach's alpha = .68), and strongly unidimensional, we follow previous researchers in treating anger, fear, and hatred as discrete emotional reactions with distinct behavioral consequences (e.g. Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007).

*Knowing a Group Member*: Many of these disliked groups are not particularly well-known to the American people. For instance, Only 17.4 % of the respondents reported that they actually know a member of their disliked group; the remainder did not. The groups differ significantly ($p < .001$) in the frequency of being known to our respondents ($eta^2 = .18$). Virtually no one knew a communist or a person advocating doing away with the government and letting the military run the country, but a large proportion claimed to know a liberal.

**Inter-Group Variance in Political Tolerance**

The first question we seek to answer is whether intolerance varies by the group selected by the respondent. Table 3 reports these results. We find that even though all respondents are asked about their most disliked group, the level of political tolerance varies considerably depending on

the group selected. A set of group dummy variables in fact account for 12% of the variance ($eta^2$) in individual-level political tolerance. The average tolerance score ranges from .72 for liberals to .42 for members of the Ku Klux Klan (on a scale from 0 to 1, among those who select each group as their disliked group). Thus, although the least-liked approach controls for respondents' affect toward groups, it still results in considerable inter-group variation in tolerance.

[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The standard micro-level model of tolerance does not include group as a factor, but it does include perceptions of group threat, along with demographics and socio-political values. The question to which we now turn is whether groups continue to exert an effect on tolerance once we have accounted for all the covariates in the standard micro-level model. Our method of doing so is to include a set of group dummy variables in OLS regression models of tolerance, progressively adding more independent variables until the effect of group becomes insignificant, if it ever in fact does so.

We begin with a simple model, including only a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was asked about her or his most-disliked or third-most-disliked group. We then add blocks of micro-level variables in turn: the set of demographics, socio-political values, group evaluations, including threat, and finally, emotional reactions to the group. We then specify another set of five OLS regression models, identical to the first set except that we add the group dummy variables to each. We report the adjusted-$R^2$ statistic for each equation in Table 4.

[PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

The ten group dummy variables account for an additional 10.3 % of the variance in

tolerance beyond that explained by the indicator for whether the group is most-disliked. Adding demographics to the model scarcely diminishes this proportion of variance explained by the group indicators. And while this proportion decreases as the tolerance model becomes more fleshed out, groups still account for an additional 5.1 % of the variance when included together with all the micro-level variables. Inter-group variance in tolerance remains, to a considerable degree, unexplained by threat and other factors.[7]

Thus, our analysis clearly demonstrates that not all of the inter-group variance in tolerance can be explained by the traditional model of the etiology of intolerance, even when that model is supplemented with additional, theoretically-derived variables. So far, the evidence is that groups matter. Consequently, we turn to multilevel modeling in an effort to determine how much groups matter and which group attributes are of consequence.

**Investigating Inter-Group Variation in the Determinants of Tolerance**

It is useful to examine the micro-level model of the determinants of political tolerance more closely in order to assess the degree to which including group indicators, and thus removing the inter-group variance in tolerance, affects the influence of the predictors in the model. We specify two OLS regression models of tolerance: one without group intercepts, the other with. These correspond with the two models in the bottom row of Table 4. A comparison of the two sets of

[7] We note that this is a conservative test of the influence of the groups on tolerance, inasmuch as the incremental explained variance (known as the "part coefficient") is calculated *after* the primary variables are allowed to explain all the variance they can. Any explained variance shared by the primary variables and the group indicators is, by this method, attributed to the primary variables.

model results allows us to establish the degree to which bringing groups back in changes the effects of our micro-level variables. Results for these two models are reported in Table 5.

[PLACE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Our models expand on the standard micro-level model through the incorporation of several new variables: the three indicators of emotional engagement with the group, knowing a group member, and evaluations of the extent to which a group is undemocratic. Knowing members of the disliked group increases tolerance, while perceiving the group to be undemocratic marginally decreases tolerance. Both of these effects are attenuated somewhat when the inter-group variance in tolerance is removed by incorporating group dummy variables in Model 2, although both effects remain significant.

The last set of new variables, measuring varieties of emotional engagement with the group, also have a significant effect on levels of tolerance.[8] However, contrary to the findings of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009), hatred does not have a stronger effect on intolerance than anger and fear. If anything, our results suggest that, among Americans, anger is the most important emotional pathway to intolerance. Fear is largely irrelevant for intolerance. These data provide hints that varieties of emotional reaction are promising micro-level determinants of intolerance – a finding that is well worth further investigation.

The results for the other independent variables are similar to those obtained in earlier research (Gibson 2013). Demographics, with the exception of education (Bobo and Licari 1989),

[8] When we use an index of engagement, based on all three emotions, we find that the coefficient for the index is a highly significant −.16, which seems to imply that the effects of the three discrete emotions are to some degree additive.

are not substantively important even if occasionally significant, while socio-political values, particularly a preference for liberty over order and open-mindedness versus dogmatism, remain powerful predictors of tolerance. Including group indicators (Model 2) has little impact on the effects of these variables – unsurprisingly, as these are broad, not group-specific values. The effects of group threat, however, are somewhat reduced when the inter-group variance in tolerance is removed in Model 2. Although sociotropic threat is still highly significant, the coefficient is reduced from −.15 to −.11. The coefficient for group power is also reduced, from .04 to .01, and is no longer significant when group indicators are included, while the effect of egocentric threat remains essentially unchanged at .05, compared with .04 in Model 1.

Thus, in sum, the micro-level model is largely unperturbed by the inclusion of group dummy variables. However, as we might expect, our measures of group evaluations, including threat, become a little weaker when we restrict our focus to their effects on intra-group variance in tolerance. The question to which we now turn is whether group-level measures of group attributes such as threat and willingness to follow democratic norms help explain some of the puzzling inter-group variation in tolerance.

**Testing a Multilevel Level Model of Group Influence**

Multilevel models are ideal for investigating inter-group variance in tolerance because such models are designed for data where lower-level units are nested within higher-order units (see Gelman and Hill 2007). In a typical application, analysts specify a geographic area, such as states or countries, as the higher-order unit; instead, we treat groups as the higher-level variable, in

effect modeling respondents as nested within groups (see also Ghitza and Gelman 2013). The dummy variable (or fixed effects) model we use in Table 5 permits us to partial out the inter-group variance in the dependent variable. But multilevel models allow us to go further and investigate the effects of this between-group variance. The primary means of doing so is to include group-level as well as respondent-level variables in the analysis.

We are interested in evaluating the degree to which group attributes – group renown and group reputations for being threatening, powerful, and undemocratic – help explain tolerance toward these groups. To measure these group-level variables, we use respondent evaluations of the degree to which groups are seen as sociotropically and egocentrically threatening, powerful, undemocratic, and whether respondents know members of the group. However, we cannot simply take the 11 group averages for each of these five variables as constituting valid measures of group attributes on each of these five domains.

Hidden in plain sight in Table 5 are two methodological problems of considerable significance. First, we only solicited evaluations from the sub-sample of respondents who regard the group as one of their most-disliked. For example, the only data we have on the degree to which Communists are violent is from those respondents who dislike Communists a great deal. These respondents are a small subset of the whole sample, and, more troublingly, are a subset selected based on their dislike of the group in question. Another way of putting this problem is that respondents are assigned to groups through a non-random process. Moreover, we suspect that the mechanism through which people selected their highly-disliked groups is correlated with the evaluations of these groups (e.g., the degree to which they are threatening to society), which

are the attributes we would like to measure and use in the multilevel modeling.

Second, these group evaluations are presumed to be causes of intolerance in this analysis. However, it is easy to imagine that group assessments are post-hoc rationalizations for respondents' own intolerance, which is to say that the assessments are endogenous to intolerance. For example, a socially acceptable justification for intolerance is that the group does not play by the rules of the democratic game. We suspect that people hold many beliefs about groups they do not tolerate, ranging from their undemocraticness to their body odor. That these beliefs are causes of intolerance is not likely to be true of all respondents.

We address the first problem – non-random of selection of respondents to groups – by using Heckman (1976, 1979) models. This model is a standard approach within political science to correct for the effects of selection bias (e.g. Berinsky 1999, von Stein 2005). We will use Heckman models to provide average measures of group attributes adjusting for the probability that each respondent chooses a particular group. In the first step of this procedure, we model the probability that each respondent is selected into each sample using probit models for each group. The inverse Mills ratio, a transformation of the predicted probability of selection, is then included in each of the second stage linear models of the group evaluations. To obtain the corrected group evaluation averages, we find the mean of the fitted values for these second-stage linear models that is part of the multilevel model.[9]

[9] There are two major sources of endogeneity that may affect our estimates regarding the effects of group attributes on political intolerance: 1) non-random selection process, respondents who select different disliked groups may have different individual characteristics; and, 2) simultaneity, group attributes may cause intolerance toward that group, yet intolerance toward a group may lead to a post hoc rationalization of perceived group attributes. While we acknowledge the importance of each of the sources of bias that are common to most

The Heckman correction requires that we have adequate models of the process by which individuals are selected or not. Fortunately, we have a good deal of data that are pertinent to this selection mechanism: the respondents' affect toward each group (via a feeling thermometer), for all respondents and for all groups (see Table 1, above). Indeed, immediately after soliciting thermometer responses for all 11 groups, we asked respondents to rank their three most-disliked groups. We therefore expect that group selection is to some degree determined by group affect. We also have respondents' demographic information and socio-political orientations, which will further aid in prediction.

Heckman models are not designed to address endogeneity, the second problem we face. However, it seems likely that part of any reverse causal effect flows through the respondents' choice of disliked group, and thus the selection process that we model and correct for. In other words, while intolerance towards a particular group – radical Muslims, for example – may shape the extent to which this group is seen as respecting democratic procedures, at least part of this effect manifests in the choice of radical Muslims as a highly-disliked group. By adjusting for this potential, our Heckman procedure helps mitigate some, although probably not all, of the adverse consequences of such endogeneity.

Nevertheless, although one of our ambitions in this chapter is to test group-level determinants of intolerance, we note that the potential endogeneity of intolerance and group evaluations, the non-random assignment of respondents to groups, and – we should add – the

observational studies, we go some distance into minimizing them by implementing the Heckman correction on our averages of group evaluations. See our discussion on these methodological limitations in our concluding section.

small number of groups for which we have evaluations, mean that our results suggest, rather than demand, causal conclusions. We return to this issue in the conclusion.

Our models include all the micro-level variables that we discuss in the previous section. The results of the basic multilevel model with all such variables and varying (or random) group intercepts are very similar to Model 2 in Table 5. Our focus here, however, is on the effects of group attributes on tolerance of the highly-disliked groups, and our multilevel approach allows us to investigate inter-group variance in tolerance through the incorporation of group-level variables. To the extent that the inclusion of group-level variables reduces the error variance of our group-level equation, the variable is accounting for some of the fairly considerable inter-group variance in tolerance. We report the group-level error variance using the standard deviation of the group intercepts, with the individual-level error variance being measured using the residual standard deviation, a familiar quantity from OLS regression modeling.

We add our five group-level measures to separate multilevel linear models of tolerance, otherwise specified as in Table 5. We include these variables separately because, with only 11 groups at the group level, it is inadvisable to attempt to estimate more than one additional group-level regression coefficient. The results are shown in Table 6. We report only the coefficient estimates for the five group-level measures, although the full set of micro-level variables (see Table 5) is included in each model.

[PLACE TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Table 6 reports six models: the first is the baseline micro-level model with varying group intercepts but without group-level variables; the second and third include the measures of group

average sociotropic and egocentric threat; the fourth, fifth and sixth add measures of reputations for being powerful, violent, and undemocratic. All of these models, with the exception of the fifth, include the corresponding individual-level evaluation as well as the group-level measure.[10]

Although it might seem confusing to incorporate the same variable at two levels of analysis, there is a natural interpretation to both the group- and individual-level measures, and thus their coefficient estimates. The group-level measures capture the variance in the attribute (e.g., undemocratic, threatening to society) that is particular to that group. They can be thought of as measuring the reputations earned (whether fairly or not) by each group. The larger the sample offering an evaluation of each group, the more reliable these reputational measures are. When included alongside the group-level reputation measures, the respondent-level variables measuring the individual deviations from the group averages, or the intra-group evaluations of each attribute.[11] These intra-group evaluations are the portion of variance in group evaluations that remain after the group averages are subtracted. We can therefore think of these measures as capturing that part of group evaluations that is due to personal experience, personality, and other respondent-level characteristics.

Turning to the results of our multilevel models in Table 6, we see that two of the five group-level measures have a significant effect on political tolerance. Groups that are seen as powerful (Model 4) are more tolerated, while groups that are believed to be violent (Model 5) or undemocratic (Model 6) are less tolerated. While perceptions that the group is undemocratic has

[10] Because the question on group violence is only answered by 1,242 respondents, we exclude the micro-level measure from the models.

[11] When included without the group-level reputation measures, respondent-evaluation measures capture both group-specific and respondent-specific variance.

a significant and similarly-signed effect at the individual level, power does not (see Model 2 in Table 5).[12] Thus, while beliefs that a group is undemocratic reduces tolerance at both the individual and group levels, perceived power only affects tolerance at the group level. In addition, groups that are believed to be violent are less tolerated, although not significantly so.

The *positive* effect of group power is unexpected, but it may simply be a spurious correlation produced by the covariance between group power, on the one hand, and group attributes such as being mainstream or conventional, on the other. It would be of interest to investigate this effect further, but we unfortunately cannot do so because, with only 11 groups, we cannot reliably include control variables in our group-level models.

An examination of the standard deviation of the group intercepts shows how the inclusion of such group-level attributes can help account for the unexplained effects of groups on least-liked tolerance: including group reputations for being undemocratic reduces this standard deviation from .078 in the baseline model to .066.

Finally, although individual perceptions of sociotropic and egocentric threat are linked with intolerance, we do not find evidence that groups that are thought to be more threatening to society (Model 1) or the respondents themselves (Model 2) are less tolerated. Neither is there evidence that tolerance is lower toward groups thought to be violent. Instead, it seems that all relevant variance in the threat posed by groups is influential only at the individual level.

In sum, the multilevel analysis has found that groups believed to be powerful and democratic are more tolerated at the group-level. Beliefs that a group is democratic also shows

[12] But as we see in Model 1, Table 5, power does have a positive individual effect in the OLS model, where intra- and inter-group variation in tolerance are not differentiated.

individual-level effects on tolerance, while beliefs that a group is powerful do not. Egocentric and sociotropic threat only show individual-level effects. We emphasize that these results should be treated with caution. We only have a sample of 11 groups. Moreover, although group sociotropic threat and group violence are not significant, but group undemocratic is, these three coefficients are almost of the same magnitude. We think our analysis clearly supports the minimalist conclusion that between-group variance in tolerance is worth further investigation.

**Discussion and Concluding Comments**

This chapter has examined the effects of groups in shaping tolerance judgments. The least-liked measurement technology is designed to control for affect toward groups, but we find that groups continue to matter for political tolerance even when using least-liked measures. Average levels of political tolerance indeed vary substantially across disliked groups. And even in a fully-specified micro-level model of tolerance, group indicators continue to account for significant additional variance. As valuable as the least-liked measurement technology is, it does not control for all of the variance associated with the individual group named as the target of tolerance.

The fully-specified model reveals some additional interesting findings. First, perceived threat is a fundamental predictor of tolerance at the individual level. In this regard, sociotropic threat is one of the stronger predictors of intolerance; egocentric threat, much less so; and group power, not at all. Respondents' education, open-mindedness, and a preference for liberty over order also exert powerful effects on tolerance. Additionally, we found that two emotional reactions to the group – anger and hatred – are predictors of intolerance, as is personally

knowing a group member, and evaluations of the extent to which a group is undemocratic.

To further explore the effects of groups we use fixed effect and multilevel models to isolate and analyze separately within- and between-group variance in tolerance. In our fixed-effects model, which focuses only on within-group variance, we see that measures of group evaluations, such as threat, group power, and knowledge of a group member show slightly diminished effects. Thus, although the conclusions of existing research regarding individual-level determinants of tolerance remain substantively unperturbed, we find evidence that group-level attributes play a significant role in tolerance judgments.

To explore the effects of group attributes in explaining inter-group variance in tolerance, we turned to multilevel models. Such models allow us to examine both the intra- and inter-group variance in tolerance. To accomplish the latter, we use selection bias-corrected average levels of five evaluations as measures of group-level attributes: the extent to which each disliked group is seen as threatening to society and to respondents, powerful, undemocratic, and violent. Two of these measures have significant effects in the group-level model. Group power increases tolerance, while a reputation for being undemocratic decreases it. In other words, reputations earned (whether fairly or not) by each group for being powerful makes citizens more tolerant toward the group, while reputations for following the rules of democracy renders citizens less tolerant toward the group. These findings hold true after adjusting for both respondents' characteristics (e.g., demographics, ideology) and respondents' perceptions of the group (e.g., sociotropic and egocentric threat, group power, democraticness, emotional attachments to the group). By contrast, group reputations for violence, or for posing a threat to society or

individuals, do not show significant effects on political tolerance. We conclude that not only does political intolerance depend on respondents' individual characteristics (e.g., whether more or less educated), but also on the reputations earned by the group that the respondent selects as his or her least liked.

For a number of reasons, the results of these multilevel models should be read with caution. Our group-level measures, although corrected for selection bias, are based on data from small samples of respondents who answered questions about groups regarded as one of their most disliked. The number of groups for which we have data ($N = 11$) is additionally small; indeed, too small to reliably include any group-level controls. And furthermore, one could argue that evaluations of a group are endogenous to tolerance toward that group, undermining the ability to claim that the former cause the latter.

Yet, we think that bringing groups back into the study of political tolerance is worthy of further inquiry, as there are significant practical implications. Because the least-liked technique asks respondents about different groups, it is not straightforward to use the resulting measures of tolerance to determine whether a particular public will become intolerant toward any given group in the future (Gibson 2013). Further investigation into group-level variance in political tolerance would help shed light on the kind of groups that might become victims of intolerance in future.[13] As our findings have suggested, groups that are perceived to be undemocratic, and surprisingly, not very powerful, are most at risk of being the focus of mass intolerance.

[13] We note that the question of whether intolerance is focused or pluralistic is separate to our analyses in this chapter, even if the political consequences of intolerance depend heavily on the degree to which it is focused (e.g., Gibson 2008).

As useful as the least-liked technology is, it still leaves group-based variance in tolerance "on the table." Perceptions of group threat, as conceptualized and operationalized to date, do not seem to capture all that is meaningful to people about their highly disliked groups. We hope that our analysis stimulates those thinking about political intolerance to think a bit harder about how attributes of political enemies are perceived and how those perceptions structure levels of intolerance.

Although our analysis has been unwaveringly empirical in nature, our findings, and this approach to bringing groups back into the study of political intolerance, has clear and quite important normative consequences that we cannot ignore. We (and others) contend that assessments of groups influence citizens' willingness to tolerate political activities by those groups. For instance, some may claim that because a group is "undemocratic," it does not deserve to be tolerated. But what is the source of the belief that a group is undemocratic and how accurate are those perceptions? Political tolerance in many polities, including the United States, is a socially desirable position, making "undemocratic" an easy justification for those who simply do not want to put up with political activity by their enemies. In order to be more comfortable with intolerance, some respondents no doubt *deduce* attributes of the group. Indeed, we suspect that some respondents would ascribe virtually any negative attribute to groups that they are unwilling to tolerate. And even if group reputations cause tolerance, one wonders how these reputations are formed, and the degree to which they are grounded in empirical reality. How does one know, for instance, that the KKK is undemocratic? Obviously, this is not based on knowledge of internal procedures within the organization; instead, it most likely is grounded in

nothing more than disagreement with the assumed political position of the group. And which group – there are many KKK organizations in this country – and how does one know the position of the groups? Many times in American political history, groups have been tarred with attributes that they do not objectively deserve – were American Communists in the 1940s and 1950s violent; and, indeed, given the diversity of "Communists" is it even clear that all "Communists" actually called for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government; and, if so, how does one know that the group plotted violence? Group reputations are often manipulated and undeserved – are suicide bombers sub-human, and if so does that include Kamikazee pilots in World War II – and they are often nothing more than the result of efforts to delegitimize political opponents.[14] Enemies that are "disloyal" or "un-American" or "violent" or "anti-democratic" need not be debated and discussed; civil rights workers (or anti-apartheid activists) are most easily dismissed and discarded if they are labelled "Communists."

We therefore reiterate that nothing in our analysis is meant to accept "un-democratic" or even "violent" as a justification for intolerance, and nothing in our analysis demonstrates that beliefs about these groups are rational and deserved. And we leave for another day empirical research into the question of how citizens develop their stereotypes about groups with which they disagree.

[14] For an excellent example of how elites seek to manipulate public opinion by presenting their opponents as "undemocratic" (e.g., communists) when the true bone of contention is something otherwise (e.g., racial integration) see Carleton 1985.

## References

American Association for Public Opinion Research. 2004. *Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys*. [http://www.aapor.org/pdfs/standarddefs_3.1.pdf, accessed 9/22/2005].

Berinsky, Adam. 1999. "The Two Faces of Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 1209-1230

Bobo, Lawrence, and Frederick C. Licari. 1989. "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53(3): 285-308.

Carleton, Don E. 1985. *Red Scare: Right-Wing Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and Their Legacy in Texas*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2007. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel / Hierarchical Models*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ghitza, Yair, and Andrew Gelman. 2013. "Deep Interactions with MRP: Election Turnout and Voting Patterns among Small Electoral Subgroups." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 762-76.

Gibson, James L. 2013. "Measuring Political Tolerance and General Support for Pro-Civil Liberties Policies Notes, Evidence, and Cautions." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 77(1): 45-68.

Gibson, James L. 2008. "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half-

Century After McCarthyism." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (#1, January): 96-108.

Gibson, James L. 2006. "Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*." *Perspectives on Politics* 4(1): 21-34.

Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 819-850.

Gibson, James L. 1992. "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance be 'Least-Liked'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36(2): 560-577.

Gibson, James L., and Amanda Gouws. 2003. *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, James L., and Richard D. Bingham. 1982. "On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 76(3): 603-620.

Halperin, Eran, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2009. "The Central Role of Group- Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel." *Political Psychology* 30(1): 93:123.

Heckman, James. 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models." *Annals of Economic and Social Measurement* 5(4): 475-492.

Heckman, James. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error." *Econometrica* 47 (January): 153-162

Holbrook, Allyson L., Jon A. Krosnick, and Alison M. Pfent. 2007. "Response Rates in Surveys

by the News Media and Government Contractor Survey Research Firms." In James Lepkowski, N. Clyde Tucker, J. Michael Brick, Edith D. de Leeuw, Lilli Japec, Paul J. Lavrakas, Michael W. Link, and Roberta L. Sangster, eds., *Advances in Telephone Survey Methodology*. New York: Wiley.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese. 2007. "On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger." In Ann N. Crigler, Michael MacKuen, and George E. Marcus, eds., *The Affect Effect: The Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kuklinski, James H., Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Robert S. Wyer, Jr. 1991. "The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(1): 1-27.

Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Sandra L. Woods. 1995. *With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Daniel Stevens. 2005. "The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the Formation of Political Tolerance Judgements." *Political Psychology* 26(6): 949-963.

Marcus, George E., Sandra L. Wood, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1998. "Linking Neuroscience to Political Intolerance and Political Judgement." *Politics and the Life Sciences* 17(2): 165-178.

Petersen, Michael, Rune Slothuus, Rune Stubager, and Lise Togeby. 2011. "Freedom for All?

The Strength and Limits of Political Tolerance." *British Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 581-597.

Stouffer, Samuel C. 1955. *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties.* New York: Doubleday.

Sullivan, John L., George E. Marcus, Stanley Feldman, and James E. Piereson. 1981. "The Source of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 75(1): 92-106.

Sullivan, John L., James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1979. "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s-1970s." *American Political Science Review* 73(3): 781-794.

Sullivan, John L., James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-622

**Table 1. The Distribution of Group Affect, FATS 2007-2011**

| Group | Group Affect (Feeling Thermometer) | | | | % Most Disliked | % Among Three Most Disliked |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % Disliked Very Much[a] | Mean | Std. Dev. | *N* | | |
| Conservatives | 7.0 | 53.8 | 22.9 | 4,084 | .5 | 2.0 |
| Christian fundamentalists | 12.8 | 48.5 | 26.1 | 4,086 | 1.5 | 7.2 |
| Liberals | 11.3 | 48.3 | 23.6 | 4,088 | .8 | 3.9 |
| Gay rights activists | 22.9 | 45.3 | 30.6 | 4,079 | 1.9 | 9.4 |
| Anti-abortion activists | 35.1 | 37.1 | 33.2 | 4,083 | 1.6 | 14.6 |
| Pro-abortion activists | 39.2 | 30.9 | 33.3 | 3,993 | 6.2 | 19.4 |
| Communists | 50.4 | 26.1 | 24.7 | 4,086 | 4.8 | 25.9 |
| Radical Muslims | 56.0 | 20.3 | 23.7 | 4,068 | 14.2 | 39.5 |
| Atheists | 64.9 | 16.9 | 24.7 | 3,690[b] | 10.6 | 36.8 |
| Militarists | 77.7 | 10.6 | 20.1 | 4,092 | 15.1 | 42.8 |
| Members of the Ku Klux Klan | 84.1 | 7.5 | 17.0 | 4,089 | 35.8 | 69.5 |

Notes: [a] "Disliked Very Much" is defined as affect thermometer scores of 10 degrees or lower toward the group. Percentages are computed from the valid responses, which include "don't know" responses, but exclude refusals to answer. The number of observations for the least-liked questions is 4,066. Groups are sorted in order of decreasing mean affect.

[b] The survey design in 2008 included a split ballot structure on the question about atheists, in which only one-half of the sample in 2008 received the same wording question as in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011. To ensure consistency in the measure, we exclude respondents who received a different wording question in 2008.

Source: Freedom and Tolerance Surveys, 2007 – 2011.

**Table 2. Political Tolerance, Highly Disliked Groups, 2007 – 2011**

| | Political Tolerance | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Percentage | | | | | |
| | Intolerant | Undecided | Tolerant | Mean | Std. Dev. | *N* |
| *Most Disliked Group* | | | | | | |
| Allow Speech | 43.1 | 7.5 | 49.4 | 3.0 | 1.4 | 2,073 |
| Not Ban From Running for Office | 44.2 | 7.9 | 47.8 | 2.9 | 1.4 | 2,067 |
| Allow Rallies | 47.2 | 9.7 | 43.1 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 2,067 |
| Tolerance Index | – | – | – | 2.9 | 1.1 | 2,069 |
| *Another Highly Disliked Group* | | | | | | |
| Allow Speech | 30.1 | 11.1 | 58.8 | 3.3 | 1.3 | 2,058 |
| Not Ban From Running for Office | 35.9 | 11.6 | 52.5 | 3.2 | 1.4 | 2,057 |
| Allow Rallies | 37.0 | 11.5 | 51.5 | 3.1 | 1.3 | 2,058 |
| Tolerance Index | – | – | – | 3.2 | 1.1 | 2,059 |

Notes: The percentages are calculated on the basis of collapsing the five-point Likert response set (e.g., "strongly support" and "support" responses are combined). The means and standard deviations are calculated on the uncollapsed distributions. Higher mean scores indicate more political tolerance. Note that the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked the tolerance questions of either their most disliked or another highly disliked group.

**Table 3: Levels of Political Tolerance by Disliked Group**

| Highly-Disliked Group | Political Tolerance | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | *N* |
| Liberals | .72 | .19 | 61 |
| Christian fundamentalists | .70 | .22 | 116 |
| Conservatives | .70 | .17 | 37 |
| Anti-abortion activists | .66 | .23 | 187 |
| Militarists | .63 | .24 | 702 |
| Atheists | .56 | .24 | 533 |
| Pro-abortionists activists | .47 | .27 | 239 |
| Gay rights activists | .47 | .24 | 126 |
| Communists | .45 | .28 | 359 |
| Radical Muslims | .45 | .26 | 589 |
| Members of the Ku Klux Klan | .42 | .28 | 979 |

Notes: Groups are sorted in order of decreasing tolerance. The tolerance index ranges from 0 to 1, with high scores indicating higher levels of political tolerance. Because this analysis is based on groups selected as highly-disliked by the respondents, the Ns for each of the groups vary.

**Table 4: Tolerance Regression Model Fit, With and Without Group Indicators**

| Regression Model | Adjusted $R^2$ | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Without Group Indicators | With Group Indicators | $R^2$ Increase With Group Indicators |
| Most-disliked status only | .016 | .119 | .103 |
| + demographics | .163 | .253 | .090 |
| + socio-political values | .268 | .346 | .078 |
| + group evaluations | .326 | .377 | .051 |
| + emotional reactions | .342 | .393 | .051 |

Notes: Cell entries show the adjusted $R^2$ statistic for OLS regression models of tolerance with the variables indicated in the table rows included and group indicators either included or excluded. *N* varies from 3,921 in the top row to 3,688 in the bottom. "Socio-political values" are ideology, partisan identity, preference for liberty over order, support for the rule of law, and open-mindedness. "Group evaluation" variables are sociotropic and egocentric threat, group power, perceptions that the group is undemocratic, and knowledge of the group. "Emotional reactions" are fear, anger, and hatred toward group.

**Table 5: Micro-Level Models of the Etiology of Political Tolerance**

| | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coeffi-cients | Std. Errors | Sig. | Coeffi-cients | Std. Errors | Sig. |
| Intercept | .29 | (.03) | *** | .31 | (.03) | *** |
| Group is most (vs. 3rd-most) disliked | −.06 | (.01) | *** | −.04 | (.01) | *** |
| Sociotropic threat | −.15 | (.02) | *** | −.11 | (.02) | *** |
| Egocentric threat | .04 | (.01) | ** | .05 | (.01) | *** |
| Group power | .04 | (.02) | * | .01 | (.02) | |
| Perception that group is undemocratic | −.05 | (.01) | *** | −.03 | (.01) | ** |
| Anger | −.07 | (.01) | *** | −.08 | (.01) | *** |
| Fear | −.02 | (.01) | | −.04 | (.01) | ** |
| Hatred | −.06 | (.01) | *** | −.05 | (.01) | *** |
| Knows group member | .08 | (.01) | *** | .05 | (.01) | *** |
| Liberty preferred to order | .24 | (.02) | *** | .22 | (.02) | *** |
| Support for the rule of law | .08 | (.02) | *** | .07 | (.02) | ** |
| Open-mindedness | .26 | (.02) | *** | .24 | (.02) | *** |
| Ideological identity (liberal=high) | .01 | (.02) | | .02 | (.01) | |
| Partisan identity (Democrat=high) | −.01 | (.01) | | −.02 | (.01) | |
| Religious attendance | −.02 | (.02) | | −.02 | (.01) | |
| Born again | −.02 | (.01) | | −.01 | (.01) | |
| Female | .06 | (.01) | *** | .05 | (.01) | *** |
| Level of education | .16 | (.01) | *** | .16 | (.01) | *** |
| Owns home | −.01 | (.01) | | −.01 | (.01) | |
| Age | .03 | (.02) | | .01 | (.02) | |
| Black | −.05 | (.01) | *** | −.04 | (.01) | *** |
| Hispanic | −.04 | (.01) | ** | −.04 | (.01) | ** |
| Group dummy variables | No | | | Yes | | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .34 | | | .39 | | |
| *N* respondents | 3,688 | | | 3,688 | | |
| Standard deviation of residuals | .22 | | | .22 | | |

Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance. OLS regression models. Model 2 adds to Model 1 dummy variables for the disliked groups.
All variables in this analysis range from 0 through 1. See Appendix B for more information on the distributions of the variables.

**Table 6: Multilevel Linear Models of Tolerance Showing Effects of Group Attributes**

| *Group level attributes* | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Group threatens society (sociotropic threat) | | −.13 | | | | |
| | | (.08) | | | | |
| Group threatens respondent (egocentric threat) | | | −.05 | | | |
| | | | (.07) | | | |
| Group is powerful | | | | .22 ** | | |
| | | | | (.08) | | |
| Group is violent | | | | | −.12 | |
| | | | | | (.09) | |
| Group is undemocratic | | | | | | −.14 * |
| | | | | | | (.07) |
| Micro-level variables included | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Akaike information criterion | 186.7 | 189.3 | 191.6 | 185.2 | 189.9 | 188.3 |
| Std. deviation of residuals | .22 | .22 | .22 | .22 | .22 | .22 |
| Std. deviation of group intercepts | .078 | .071 | .080 | .058 | .074 | .066 |
| *N* respondents | 3,688 | 3,688 | 3,688 | 3,688 | 3,688 | 3,688 |
| *N* groups | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 |

Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance. All micro-level variables from Table 5 are included in these models. Cell entries are multilevel linear model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables in this analysis range from 0 through 1.

## Appendix A: Survey Details, Freedom and Tolerance Surveys

All of these surveys were conducted by SRBI (SRBI/Abt). In 2007, 2008, and 2009, we used a standard random digit dial (RDD) design; in 2010 and 2011, the RDD sample was supplemented with a cell-phone sub-sample.

*2007 – 2009*

These surveys are based on a nationally representative RDD sample. Conducted by Schulman, Ronca, and Bucuvalas Inc. (SRBI), Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing was used. The initial questionnaires were subjected to a formal test, and, on the basis of the results of the pretests, were significantly revised. Within households, the respondents were selected randomly. The final data sets were subjected to some relatively minor post-stratification and was also weighted to accommodate variability in the sizes of the respondents' households.

In 2007, the interviews averaged around 25 minutes in length. The AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.8% and the AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 29.5 % (see AAPOR 2004), which is about the average of telephone surveys these days (Holbrook, Krosnick, and Pfent 2007).

In 2008, the interviews average about 30 minutes. The AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.6% and the AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.5 %

In 2009, the interviews averaged around 37 minutes in length. The AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.6% and the AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.5 %.

*2010 – 2011*

The 2010 and 2011 surveys used a research design that combines a standard RDD subsample with a cell-phone only subsample. Samples were drawn from both the landline and cell phone national random digit dial (RDD) frames. Persons with residential landlines were not screened out of the cell phone sample. Both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International, LLC, according to Abt SRBI specifications. Numbers for the landline sample were drawn with equal probabilities from active blocks (area code + exchange + two-digit block number) that contained one or more residential directory listings. The cellular sample was drawn through a systematic sampling from 1000-blocks dedicated to cellular service according to the Telcordia database. For the landline portion of the sample, the respondents were selected randomly within household.

In 2010, the interviews averaged around twenty-eight minutes in length. The overall AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 47.6 % and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.9 %. For the RDD stratum, the AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 49.1 % and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.9%. The rates within the cell-phone stratum are slightly lower: the AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 41.6% and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 26.6%.

In 2011, the interviews averaged around twenty-eight minutes in length. The overall AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.7% and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 29.6%. For the RDD stratum, the AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.3% and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.3%. The rates within the cell-phone stratum are similar: the AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 45.5% and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 27.0%.

## Appendix B: The Distributions of the Variables

**Table B1. The Distributions of the Variables Used in the Analyses**

| Variable | Range | Mean | Std. Dev. | *N* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political tolerance | 0 → 1 | .51 | .28 | 3,688 |
| Sociotropic threat | 0 → 1 | .71 | .29 | 3,688 |
| Egocentric threat | 0 → 1 | .69 | .30 | 3,688 |
| Group power | 0 → 1 | .43 | .27 | 3,688 |
| Perception that group is undemocratic | 0 → 1 | .60 | .34 | 3,688 |
| Anger | 0 → 1 | .63 | .34 | 3,688 |
| Fear | 0 → 1 | .47 | .37 | 3,688 |
| Hatred | 0 → 1 | .51 | .33 | 3,688 |
| Knows group member | 0 → 1 | .17 | .38 | 3,688 |
| Liberty preferred to order | 0 → 1 | .60 | .21 | 3,688 |
| Support for the rule of law | 0 → 1 | .68 | .17 | 3,688 |
| Open-mindedness | 0 → 1 | .48 | .22 | 3,688 |
| Ideological identity (liberal=high) | 0 → 1 | .43 | .28 | 3,688 |
| Partisan identity (Democrat=high) | 0 → 1 | .55 | .34 | 3,688 |
| Religious attendance | 0 → 1 | .45 | .28 | 3,688 |
| Born again | 0 → 1 | .37 | .48 | 3,688 |
| Female | 0 → 1 | .48 | .50 | 3,688 |
| Level of education | 0 → 1 | .51 | .30 | 3,688 |
| Owns home | 0 → 1 | .71 | .46 | 3,688 |
| Age | 0 → 1 | .36 | .22 | 3,688 |
| Black | 0 → 1 | .12 | .33 | 3,688 |
| Hispanic | 0 → 1 | .11 | .32 | 3,688 |
| Group is most (versus 3rd-most) disliked | 0 → 1 | .50 | .50 | 3,688 |